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The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of the change in the definition of bank capital 
according to Basel 3. The 2008 financial crisis exposed the flaws in the global regulatory and 
supervision framework and also showed that Basel 2 could not fully protect against bank 
failures. In order to address the gaps, loopholes and deficiencies of Basel 2 and to guard against 
any future crises, the Basel 3 accord was implemented in 2013. The key change introduced by 
Basel 3 is the requirement that banks hold more capital. However, the Basel 3 accord also 
changed the definition of bank capital and risk-weighted assets (RWAs). In comparing Basel 2 
with Basel 3, several changes in the definition of capital appear. It is therefore important to 
analyse the impact of the capital definition change introduced in Basel 3. The study used a 
sample of the fifty largest commercial and investment banks by asset size from the USA and the 
Europe region. The study calculated the Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio and Basel 3 Tier 1 capital 
ratio at the same point in time by only changing the reported capital under Basel 2 and Basel 3 
but keeping the RWAs the same at Basel 2 level. This is to isolate the capital definition change 
and exclude changes to the RWA definition. The change in the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio as 
is the estimated impact of the change in the definition of bank capital according to Basel 3. The 
data sample shows that the banks in the Europe region are larger in size than the USA banks on 
average. The results show that the change in the Basel 3 capital definition had a positive impact 
on the European banks’ capital ratios and in contrast there was a negative impact on the USA 
banks’ capital ratios. The limitations of the study include the use of a small sample size of fifty 
banks,  the omission of Asian banks from the sample size even though these include some of the 
largest banks in the world, and the selection of banks with December year ends only. This study 
contributes to the literature because it is the first study to examine the capital definition change in 
Basel 3.  
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Banks are very important because they finance consumption, investment projects and also serve 
as payment mechanisms through which transactions are completed between two parties. For a 
country to grow, develop and maintain a stable economy, that country must develop its financial 
market and banking system (Barth, Gan & Nolle, 2009:2). Banks are exposed to market, credit 
and operational risks, amongst others; if these risks are not properly managed, they can cause 
bank runs and bank failures. For this reason, bank activities should therefore be closely 
monitored and the banks should be required to keep enough capital in relation to risks they may 
face (Amidu, 2007:68). Whenever a large financial institution fails, public confidence in the 
financial system is likely to diminish. Bank regulators have imposed minimum capital 
requirements for banks with the aim of reducing the scale of bank runs and bank failures and in 
order to maintain stability in the financial services sector because banks with sufficient capital 
are capable of managing their risks properly and thus reduce the risks of bank runs and bank 
failures (Dupuis, 2006:1). The challenge is how to determine what the sufficient capital level 
should be; on the one hand, if banks keep low levels of capital then they may increase the risk of 
failing while on the other hand, if they keep high levels of capital they may also decrease their 
ability to extend credit. A bank’s liquidity becomes exhausted when too much capital is set aside 
to act as reserves but maintaining too low levels of bank capital also exposes banks to a greater 
risk of insolvency (Dupuis, 2006:1).   
 
The banking sector remains one of the most regulated industries with an increased focus on 
adequacy of bank capital even though there is no agreement on a common formula for global 
banking supervision and regulation. However, increased invention and the development of new 
technology, together with the regulatory lapses in the financial system, all continue to expose the 
global financial markets and the banking system to greater risks (Sahajwala & Van den Bergh, 
2000:1). The globalisation of financial markets therefore, aims to introduce common capital 
regulations that will stabilize the banking sector and the financial system world-wide.  Bank 
supervising authorities are required to assess the bank operations and also ensure that banks have 
proper risk management frameworks in place to guard against the risks they face (Barth, Gan & 




terms of banking regulation and supervision. These include: the differences in the level of 
complexity and financial system development, number and size of financial institutions; levels of 
transparency of the financial systems, disclosure requirements; and, resources and technological 
innovation (Sahajwala & Van den Bergh, 2000:2). Despite these differences, the regulation and 
supervision of banking institutions is still expected to be in line with the international best 
practices to ensure and maintain global financial sector stability.  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was formed as a result of the financial 
market crises that followed the failure of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates 
that saw many banks suffer large foreign currency losses (Bank for international settlements, 
2014:1). The Committee is a forum for regular cooperation on banking regulatory and 
supervisory matters. The aim of the Committee is to improve the global banking regulation and 
supervision knowledge with a view to bringing stability to the banking and financial services 
sectors. The Committee develops guidelines for bank regulations and recommends the best 
practices that banks should follow (Casu, Girardone & Molyneux, 2006). The decision to 
implement the standards and follow the recommended practices rests with the central banks in 
the individual countries. The Committee also sets the minimum standards for the regulation and 
supervision of banks. It shares supervisory issues, methodologies and procedures in order to 
promote common understanding and improve cross-border cooperation. Countries are 
represented on the Committee by their central banks in those instances where the central banks 
are responsible for banking supervision. In those instances where the central bank is not 
responsible for banking supervision, authorities with formal responsibility for banking 
supervision represent their countries on the Committee (Bank for international settlements, 
2014:1). 
 
Following on from increased concerns about the stability of the banking and financial services 
sectors, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) was implemented to safeguard the global 
banking system against unexpected financial crises. The objective of Basel I was to promote and 
harmonize the regulatory and capital adequacy standards. It proposed that the banks hold 




8% of the risk-weighted assets for internationally active banks (Balin, 2008:2; Bank for 
international settlements, 2006:3). Basel I was criticized for dealing only with credit risk and for 
the omission of other important banking risks in calculating capital adequacy ratio. Basel I was 
also criticized for being very simple and for the use of broad categories of risk-weights where 
within each category the assets were treated as equally risky and given the same risk-weight. The 
framework did not consider that each risk category would contain debtors of different credit 
qualities and ratings.  
 
Given these criticisms, the Committee proposed a new and a more comprehensive capital 
adequacy framework (Basel 2) which was published in 1999 (Balthazar, 2006). Basel 2 was 
officially implemented in 2004. It maintained the pillar framework of Basel I but expanded this 
framework to cover credit, market, operational, and interest rate risks, and also included market 
based supervision and regulation in the framework. The aim of Basel 2 was to improve the 
capital regulation requirement, assist banks to identify the risks they were likely to face and help 
banks develop and improve their risk management frameworks (Bank for international 
settlements, 1996:2). The definition of capital and the minimum capital requirements of 8 % 
remained unchanged from Basel I while operational risk was added to the components of the 
regulatory capital calculation.  
 
The 2008 financial crisis exposed not only the flaws in the global regulatory and supervision 
framework and the weaknesses in the banks’ risk management procedures but also showed that 
Basel 2 could not protect fully against bank failures. With the aim of correcting the gaps, 
loopholes and deficiencies of Basel 2 and of guarding against any future crises, the global 
regulatory and the supervisory authorities considered ways of maintaining and improving the 
stability of the financial markets and thus regaining confidence in the economy. The BCBS 
published its Basel 3 accord in 2010 with the implementation of the rules to be effected from 
2013 (Schwerter, 2011:337). Basel 3 created stricter capital standards by reducing what can be 
counted as regulatory capital, proposing higher minimum capital ratios and additional capital 




risk-weighted assets. It increased common equity Tier 1 (CET 1) capital ratio from 2% to 4.5%. 
Additional Tier 1 capital ratio of 1.5% raises Tier 1 capital ratio from 4.5% to 6%. Basel 3 
introduced extra capital buffers: these were a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and a 
countercyclical buffer between 0% and 2.5% (Bank for international settlements, 2011a:2; Auer 
& Von Pfoestl, 2011:14).   
 
The 2008 financial crisis also showed that the market ignored regulatory capital as a measure of 
a bank’s capital adequacy and focused on tangible common equity (Tarullo, 2011:3). In order to 
raise the quality of regulatory capital, Basel 3 recognizes the unrealized gains or losses on 
available for sale (AFS) securities measured at fair value in its CET 1. One of the differences 
between Basel 2 and Basel 3 is that Basel 2 did not recognize unrealized gains or losses on AFS 
securities and excluded these from its Tier 1 capital while Basel 3 recognizes the unrealized 
gains or losses on AFS securities and includes them in Tier 1 capital; this leads to different 
leverage ratios and Tier 1 capital ratios under Basel 2 and Basel 3 (Song, 2014a:60). Under Basel 
2, trading revenues and realized gains or losses on AFS securities are the major components of 
regulatory Tier 1 capital measured using fair value accounting. Unrealized gains or losses on 
AFS securities were excluded from Tier 1 regulatory capital because the volatility created by fair 
value accounting does not reflect a bank’s true financial condition and also because unrealized 
gains or losses on AFS securities as opposed to net income are not useful and value relevant to 
the securities price (Dong, Ryan & Zhang, 2014:248). Basel 3 includes unrealized gains or losses 
on AFS securities with the view that unrealized losses could have an effect on a bank’s capital 
(Song, 2014a:60).  
 
The shortcomings in the risk management processes under Basel 1 and Basel 2 are one of the 
reasons why the BCBS focused more on the quality and quantity of capital that banks must hold 
under the new Basel 3 Accord, to ensure better risk absorption. The key change introduced by 
Basel 3 is the requirement that banks must hold more capital. However, at the same time, Basel 3 
also changed the definition of capital. Thus, when comparing Basel 2 with Basel 3, several 
changes in the definition of capital appear. The literature shows that there are different views 




consensus that the industry had a tangible impact on Basel 3 with some critics arguing that the 
European Union Commission wanted to make some of the Basel 3 requirements less stringent. 
The main objectives of this study are therefore to analyse the capital definition change made by 
Basel 3 and then determine whether this resulted in any change in a bank’s capital, excluding 
changes in risk-weighted assets (RWAs). Basel 3 changed not only the definition of capital but 
also RWA. However, the study examines only the capital definition change and excludes 
changes to the RWA definition, in order to isolate the capital definition change. The study used a 
sample of the fifty largest commercial and investment banks by asset size in the USA and the 
European region.  
 
In answering the research question, the study calculated the Basel 2 common equity Tier 1 
capital ratio and the Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 capital ratio at the same point in time; in 
doing so, the RWA levels were kept the same, while changing only the common equity Tier 1 
capital in the calculation. The following information for each of the fifty banks was collected: 
 Total assets as at December 2012. 
 Basel 2 Tier 1 capital as at December 2012. 
 Basel 2 RWAs as at December 2012. 
 Estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital as at December 2012 wherever the information was 
available. The estimated and reported figures were collected wherever these were 
available while in cases where they were not estimated, the study calculated the 
comparative figures using the Basel 3 capital definition.  
 The Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012, calculated as Basel 3 Tier 1 capital 
divided by Basel 3 RWAs. 
By using the collected data, the study calculated the following for each of the fifty banks: 
 Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012. 
 Estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012, calculated by changing the 
capital part from Basel 2 to Basel 3 but keeping the RWAs part the same at Basel 2 level. 
 Change in regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012. This change is the 




The data sample shows that the European banks are larger in size than the USA banks on 
average. The results show that the change in capital definition in Basel 3 resulted in a positive 
impact on the European banks capital ratios and a negative impact on the USA banks’ capital 
ratios. The results suggest that the European banks benefited more from the change in capital 
definition than the USA banks and that the capital definition change benefited the larger banks 
more than the smaller banks. The advantage that the European banks have over the USA banks 
can maybe attributed to the fact that being in Europe they could have had influence on the BCBS 
decision making process since BCBS is also in Europe. The advantage that the larger banks have 
over the smaller banks can maybe attributed to the fact that being larger they have more financial 
resources and power to influence the BCBS decision making process than the smaller banks. 
Banks with relatively higher Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratios did not derive more benefit from the 
change in capital definition because the correlation matrix show that capital definition change 
and the Basel 2 ratio variables are moving in the opposite directions and also banks with 
relatively higher Basel 2 ratio are already looking healthy and therefore their management does 
not need to be concerned about influencing the BCBS decision making process in their favour. 
Banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio also did not derive benefit from the capital 
definition change because the overall impact of the change in capital definition was a reduction 
in bank capital ratios and banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio needed to lobby 
for the change in capital definition in order to have more capital under Basel 3. 
 
The study contributes to the literature because it is the first one that examined the capital 
definition change in Basel 3. The results of this study can be used as a guideline for further 
studies in which a larger sample can be used which includes the Asian banks and other banks 
that do not have December year ends.  
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the literature review, 
research question and research hypotheses; Chapter 3 presents the research approach where the 
data and the method used in the study are explained; Chapter 4 presents the results of the study 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Background  
The globalization of the financial system has exposed the internationally active banks to lending 
and credit risks and has also raised more concerns about the profitability of financial institutions 
and confidence in the global financial system. In responding to these growing concerns, the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) developed regulatory frameworks known as the Basel 
Accords, for the internationally active financial institutions. The objective was to strengthen their 
capital adequacy and thereby regain and maintain public confidence in the stability of the 
financial system (Dupuis, 2006:3).   
 
Most of the research on the Basel Accords are from the Bank of International Settlements. For 
this reason, there are a few journal articles cited for this study. Basel 3 is a relatively new subject 
matter having been effected only in 2013 and therefore not much research has been done on it 
especially on the capital definition change. Word searches were done for “Basel 3” and “capital 
definition” on google scholar and Journal Storage (JSTOR). It is against this background that 
most of the cited articles in this study are BIS documents and other recently published articles 
which are not journal articles.  
 
2.2 Basel I 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) was designed to safeguard the global banking system 
against unexpected financial crises. This framework was designed for the member countries 
represented on the Basel Committee as well as for other countries with active international 
banks. Basel I was designed to promote and harmonize the regulatory and capital adequacy 
standards within the member states of the developed markets and was not intended to incorporate 
the needs of emerging market economies. Basel I mainly focused on credit risk and 
appropriate risk-weighting of assets. The framework proposed that the internationally active 
banks hold sufficient capital to guard against any unexpected risks they may face. Basel I 
proposed a minimum capital ratio of 8% of the risk-weighted assets for internationally active 




divided into Tier 1 and Tier 2. The elements of Tier 1 capital consist of paid-up share 
capital/common stock and disclosed reserves while Tier 2 capital consist of undisclosed reserves, 
asset revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) 
capital instruments and subordinated term debt. Basel I required that the total of Tier 2 capital 
elements are limited to a maximum of 100 percent of the total of Tier 1 capital elements; 
subordinated term debt amounts are limited to a maximum of 50 percent of Tier 1 capital 
elements; loan-loss reserves are limited to a maximum of 1.25 percentage points and asset 
revaluation reserves in the form of hidden gains on unrealized securities are subject to a discount 
of 55 percent (Bank for international settlements, 2006:77). The equation was presented as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 =  
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  ≥ 8% 
 
Basel I was criticized for the omission of other important banking risks in calculating the capital 
adequacy ratio, especially the omission of market risk. Since Basel I only focused on credit risk 
and ignored the other risks, the scope of Basel I was considered to be too narrow to protect the 
banks against all risks and to ensure stability of the global financial system. Basel I was also 
criticized for its simplicity and its random method of assigning risk weights both to on- and off- 
balance sheet items. Assets were assigned the same risk weights even though they had different 
credit qualities and ratings: this over-simplistic approach was considered to be misleading and 
could have led to the wrong calculation of capital adequacy. Another weakness of Basel I was 
lack of a common understanding of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital definitions that resulted in some 
countries allowing banks to include some unclearly defined instruments in their capital reserves 
(King & Tarbert, 2011:2). Given these weaknesses of Basel I, the Basel Committee proposed a 
new and a more comprehensive capital adequacy accord: this was the Basel 2 framework that 
was published in 1999 (Balthazar, 2006). 
 
2.3 Basel 2 
Basel 2 was implemented in 2004. It was intended to create a global standard for the banking 




reserve to guard against the unexpected financial and operational risks that they were facing. 
Basel 2 focused on maintaining consistency in regulatory matters of the internationally active 
banks to protect the global financial system from collapsing in the event of the failure of major 
banks.  The aim of Basel 2 was to set up a global risk and capital management framework 
designed to ensure that internationally active banks had adequate capital reserves in relation to 
the risks they were facing. Basel 2 proposed that banks keep adequate capital reserves according 
to those risks but with riskier banks being required to hold greater capital to ensure that they 
remain solvent and the global economy remain stable. Basel 2 also required financial institutions 
to disclose the details of their operations and risk management procedures (Dobson & Hufbauer, 
2001). It aimed at improving capital regulation requirements, assisting banks in identifying the 
risks they face and helping them to develop and improve their ability to manage those risks 
(Bank for International Settlements, 1996:1). Basel 2 maintained the pillar framework of Basel I 
and so the three pillars of Basel 2 were as follows: Pillar 1 which included minimum capital 
requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk; Pillar 2 which contained the 
supervisory review process outlining the demands on banks’ management relating to 
management of risks and capital while also defining the roles and powers of the supervisors; and 
Pillar 3 which dealt with market discipline and set out demands on banks for public disclosure 
regarding each bank’s management of risks and capital (Von Thadden, 2004).  
 
2.3.1 Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements 
Pillar 1 dealt with the calculation of minimum capital requirements for three major risks that 
bank face: these are credit, operational and market risks. Other risks were not considered under 
this pillar. The Basel I definition of capital and the minimum capital requirement of 8% of the 
RWAs both remained unchanged in Basel 2 while operational risk was added to the components 
of the regulatory capital calculation. The credit risk element can be calculated in three different 
ways as follows: first, the standardized approach; second, the foundation internal rating based 
(IRB) approach; and third, the advanced internal rating based (AIRB) approach.  For operational 
risk, the approaches were as follows: basic indicator approach; standardized approach; and, 
advanced measurement approach. For market risk, the two methods were the standardized 




implemented, the banks will move from standardized requirements to specific requirements 
developed by individual banks for each risk category they are likely to face. Banks that develop 
their own risk measurement systems will have lower risk capital requirements (Bank for 
international settlements, 2006:12). The Basel 2 equation is presented as: 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 3 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
 ≥ 8% 
 
2.3.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process  
The supervisory review process contained in Pillar 2 provided recommendations to the 
supervisory authorities to ensure that banks were able to deal with their potential financial 
problems. Pillar 2 helped banks identify other potential risks that they are likely to face but are 
not catered for in Pillar 1; this left the regulators to decide whether or not to adjust the regulatory 
capital requirement calculated in Pillar 1. Pillar 2 calls for a higher regulatory capital 
requirement than Pillar 1 and requires the banks to cater for all possible risks they might face 
including the risks not captured under Pillar 1 (Bank for international settlements, 2006:204). 
 
2.3.3 Pillar 3: Market Discipline  
Pillar 3 developed disclosure requirements that allowed market participants to measure the 
capital adequacy of financial institutions. This pillar added to the banking regulations insofar as 
it required banks to share their information for assessment by the public, which in turn enhanced 
good governance.  Pillar 3 required financial institutions to disclose their operations, capital, 
potential risk exposures, capital adequacy and risk management framework (Bank for 
international settlements, 2006:226). 
 
The 2008 crisis in the global financial markets has raised more concerns about the stability of the 
global financial system and the design of financial regulations, including Basel 2. One of the 
identified weaknesses of Basel 2 is the use of external credit rating agencies. Many financial 




internal credit assessment department. Any error in calculations by those external rating agencies 
would mean exposing the affected banks to more risks because those risks would have been 
mispriced (Teply, 2010:1479). The use of external rating agencies also poses a conflict of 
interest because the banks selling securities pay the rating agencies to assign grades to their 
assets. The banks would put pressure on the agencies for a favourable rating of their instruments. 
Highly rated securities benefit both the asset issuers and purchasers. The benefit to the issuers is 
that they increase the asset sale prices and attract more business while the benefit to the asset 
purchasers such as banks is that highly rated assets allow the banks to hold less capital reserves 
under Basel 2 (Atik, 2011:750). The second weakness arises from the pro-cyclical effects of 
Basel 2. This term ‘pro-cyclical’ refers to the reduction of lending by banks during recessions 
(Berlin, 2009:2). Basel 2 required banks to raise their regulatory capital to deal with the 
additional risk to which they are exposed. The banks are required to hold less capital by 
increasing their lending practices during an economic boom, which is just when a systematic 
crisis is likely to occur: in contrast, in an economic downturn they hold more capital by reducing 
their lending practices, at just the time when the economy needs more capital. These pro-cyclical 
effects of Basel 2 can lead to instability in the economy (Atik, 2011:751). The third weakness of 
Basel 2 is that it was not designed for developing countries; indeed, the original driving force for 
Basel 2 came from developed countries to meet their needs. The capital requirements under 
Basel 2 leave the local banks with constrained capital, making them weaker and a target for 
takeovers by advanced international banks with capital and expertise required by the regulators 
to implement Basel 2 (Bailey, 2005:25). The fourth weakness is that Basel 2 favours larger 
banking institutions with resources and capacity to implement the Basel 2 capital requirements. 
This allows the internationally active banks to dominate the domestic banking sector and become 
a threat to the domestic banks in terms of business. Developing countries also risked the threat of 
failing to attract international banks if they fail to implement the new accord (Dupuis, 2006:8). 
The fifth weakness of Basel 2 is that it required very complex systems for risk measurement and 
management that required experts and greater financial resources. Banks needed to improve their 
internal systems to meet the required standard for implementing those advanced methodologies. 
This led to a delay in the implementation process of Basel 2 as banks had to plan and reorganize 






2.4 Basel 3 
The 2008 global financial crisis exposed the flaws in the global regulatory and supervision 
framework and the weaknesses in the risk management frameworks used by the banks.  The 
crisis also demonstrated that some financial institutions in the United States of America (USA) 
had become too large and highly leveraged, to the extent that their failure could lead to financial 
instability in the USA and globally, as a result of  their interconnectedness (Song, 2014b:3). The 
crisis started in the USA and spread to the rest of the world (Schwartz, 2009:19). It developed 
from the subprime crisis, into the credit crisis, then into a financial crisis and finally became a 
global financial crisis (De Jager, 2014:101). The crisis was caused by a sharp fall in the house 
prices and high liquidity levels in the financial markets in the USA (Ackermann, 2008:329). 
Another factor that contributed to that crisis was fair value accounting (De Jager, 2014:98). This 
played a major role at the beginning of the crisis and also contributed substantially at later stages, 
arising from the fact that the market used tangible common equity for measuring banks’ capital 
adequacy: this led to substantial impacts on the leverage ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio of banks 
(Song, 2014b:5). Other factors that accelerated the financial crisis included financial innovations, 
failure of the risk management procedures for banks accompanied by weaknesses in the 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Until the early 1990s, there were strict requirements for 
house ownership in the USA and individuals had difficulties in meeting those requirements and 
thus owning houses. In particular, purchasers were required to find very large amounts of money 
for a deposit, provide proof of stable employment and a thorough analysis of their household 
income was done. The US government started to encourage individual home ownership in late 
1990s, and this move led to the strict home ownership requirements being relaxed. In this 
environment the subprime mortgage segment was introduced, that allowed borrowers with bad 
credit histories and low incomes also to buy property. There were also low documentation loans 
for which the borrower’s income was simply stated without proof in the loan application and 
loans for borrowers without income, job and assets. With these new relaxed requirements and the 
assumption that the housing prices would continue to go up, many lenders continued to extend 
credit facilities to the borrowers. This resulted in many banks taking on more risks than their 
capital base allowed. During 2006-2007, many individuals suddenly became unable to repay 




interest rate and the debt level. Nonpayment of loans led to high levels of leverage of investment 
banks and this forced the banks to seek other sources of funding through borrowing. The 
financial institutions ran into trouble when it became difficult to access funds because of a 
decline in funds in the financial sector. This reduced the banks’ ability to lend and as a result 
they required higher collateral for loans. The subprime mortgage industry collapsed, resulting in 
bank runs. Governments had to intervene and bail out financial institutions in fear of unknown 
consequences and more bank failures (Georg, 2011:2). Many financial institutions failed because 
they had taken on more risks than allowed for in terms of the capital reserves set aside to deal 
with risks (Varotto, 2011:3). The USA central bank intervened through bailouts to restore and 
maintain confidence in the banking industry: some banks were bailed out while others became 
bankrupt with one of the world’s largest investment banks, Lehman Brothers, being the largest 
victim (Ackermann, 2008:328).  
 
The global financial crisis and its consequences led to strong calls for the assessment of the 
global banking regulations. The crisis showed the need to restructure the risk approach and 
regulation of the global financial institutions. The global capital and liquidity rules needed to be 
strengthened while strict measures in banking regulation and supervision needed to be introduced 
in order to ensure a sound global financial system (Calomiris, 2009:88). In responding to these 
needs, the regulating and supervising authorities implemented adequate supervisory and 
regulatory measures to improve capital adequacies with the aim of resisting future financial 
crises (Varotto, 2011:1). Financial regulators designed new rules and regulations to deal with 
pressures still arising from the financial crisis and to prevent future financial crises. In 2010, the 
Basel Committee published the Basel 3 rules, to be effective from 2013 (Schwerter, 2011:343). 
Basel 3 improved several aspects of Basel 2, with proposed changes relating to capital 
requirements, risk coverage and measures on leverage ratios (Bank for international settlements, 
2011a:1). The aim of Basel 3 is to introduce global standards of regulation governing bank 
liquidity levels (Giustiniani & Thornton, 2011:324). Basel 3 improves the three pillars of Basel 2 






One of the core changes made in Basel 3 is the requirement for banks to have more capital than 
under Basel 2. The minimum capital requirements under Basel 3 expressed as a percentage of 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) are: Common Equity Tier (CET) 1 capital ratio of 4.5%; Tier 1 
capital ratio of 6%; and Total capital ratio of 8%. The total capital ratio remains at 8% of RWA, 
while the CET 1 capital ratio increases from 2% under Basel 2 to 4.5%. The Additional Tier 1 
capital ratio is 1.5%, raising the Tier 1 capital ratio to 6%. Basel 3 introduces a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% and a countercyclical buffer of 0% to 2.5%. For both these buffers, 
extra CET 1 capital needs to be held, raising CET 1 capital ratio to 9.5%. On top of these 
requirements, supervisory authorities may also require extra capital to cover other risks (Auer & 
Von Pfoestl, 2011:14).  
 
 Figure 1: Minimum capital requirements under Basel 2 and Basel 3. Source: Babic (2011:147). 
 
The main elements of Basel 3 are as follows: strengthening risk coverage, introducing leverage 
ratio, establishing additional buffers, dealing with Systematically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs), improving liquidity and increasing the quality and quantity of capital (King & Tarbert, 
2011:1). 
2.4.1 Strengthening Risk Coverage 
The Basel 3 accord strengthened the risk coverage of capital market activities by introducing a 
higher capital requirement for trading and securitization activities. The framework increased the 
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the banks to perform an internal assessment of externally rated securitization exposures. The 
banks are also required to use stressed inputs to determine their capital requirements for 
counterparty credit risk and hence address the issue of procyclicality. Basel 3 also raises 
standards for management of counterparty credit risk especially in instances where the exposure 
increases when the credit quality of the counterparty declines. Banks will face capital charges for 
the credit valuation adjustment risk that results from a decline in the counterparty credit 
worthiness. Basel 3 also aims to strengthen the collateral management standards and risk 
management practices (Bank for international settlements, 2011a:3).  
 
2.4.2 Introducing Leverage Ratio 
One of the causes of the financial crisis was identified as being high levels of leverage within the 
banking sector: this resulted in a global recession when banks were forced to reduce their high 
leverages significantly. Basel 3 proposed a leverage ratio requirement of 3% with the aim of 
capturing the risk that may not have been captured in the risk-weights for capital requirement 
measures. The objective of the leverage ratio is to reduce the leverage levels in the banking 
industry. The proposed leverage ratio is calculated by comparing Tier 1 capital with total 
exposure (Bank for international settlements, 2011a:4). 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
  ≥ 3% 
 
2.4.3 Establishing Additional Buffers 
The capital reserves of the banks declined because they continued to pay dividends at the start of 
the financial crisis, reducing their ability to absorb additional losses. In order to guard against 
future losses, as discussed below, Basel 3 introduced capital conservation and countercyclical 
buffers that require banks to hold extra capital during periods of strong growth, to be used when 
unexpected losses occur.  
Basel 3 introduced the requirement for banks to hold an extra 2.5% capital conservation buffer, 
which must be met entirely by CET 1 after deductions. This buffer increases the minimum 
requirement for common equity from 2% before deductions to 4.5% after deductions. The capital 




but in practice, many banks are likely to hold more than 7% common equity to be safe. Banks 
that do not meet the capital conservation buffer rule are required to retain a percentage of 
dividend payments, share buy-backs, and staff bonus payments prior to regulatory deductions 
(Bank for international settlements, 2011a:5; King & Tarbert, 2011:1). 
 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratio 
(as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.125% 100% 
> 5.125% - 5.75% 80% 
> 5.75% - 6.375% 60% 
> 6.375% - 7.0% 40% 
> 7.0% 0% 
 
Table 1: Minimum capital conservation ratios. Source: Bank for international settlements (2011a:56). 
 
Basel 3 also introduced a countercyclical capital buffer ranging from 0% to 2.5% of RWAs and 
to be met by CET1. Banks were required to implement the countercyclical buffer within twelve 
months. Banks that do not meet the capital conservation buffer rule are required to retain a 
percentage of dividend payments, share buy-backs, and staff bonus payments prior to regulatory 
deductions (Bank for international settlements, 2011a:5). 
 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratio 
(as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.75% 100% 
> 5.75% - 7.0% 80% 
> 7.0% - 8.25% 60% 
> 8.25% - 9.5% 40% 
> 9.5% 0% 
 
Table 2: Minimum capital conservation ratios under 2.5% countercyclical capital requirements. Source:  
Bank for international settlements (2011a:59).  
2.4.4 Dealing with SIFIs 
The Basel Committee and the financial stability board together developed a proposal for dealing 
with the SIFIs. The proposal includes, amongst others: capital and liquidity surcharges, tighter 




are to be assessed based on their size, interconnectedness, international activity and complexity. 
The SIFIs are required meet an extra capital requirement ranging between 1% and 2.5% 
depending on their level of importance. An additional 1% capital requirement is also 
recommended to discourage the banks from increasing their risk exposure through international 
activities (Bank for international settlements, 2011b). 
 
2.4.5 Improving Liquidity 
Basel 3 recognizes that liquidity and capital adequacy are important foundations for ensuring the 
stability of the banking sector. In view of this, two minimum standards are introduced for 
strengthening the banks’ liquidity: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR is designed to ensure that internationally active banks have 
sufficient and high quality liquid assets to replace the cash outflows they face during the 30-day 
stress period. A ratio of at least 100% is required and so the bank’s stock of high quality and 
liquid assets should at least be equal to its total cash outflows for the 30-day period. The banks 
can only use these assets in periods of financial stress (Bank for international settlements, 2013). 
High quality and liquid assets are assets that can easily be converted into cash with little or no 
loss in value during stress periods.  
 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
 ≥ 100% 
 
The NSFR is designed to promote medium- and long-term funding. It helps to determine the 
minimum amount of liquidity based on a bank’s assets and activities over a one-year period of 
extended stress. The NSFR requires that available stable funding (ASF) must exceed required 
stable funding (RSF). ASF is the total amount of a bank’s regulatory capital that matures within 
one year or more but is expected to remain at the institution for an additional period during times 
of stress. 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 





2.4.6 Increasing the Quality and Quantity of Capital 
Basel 3 increased the requirements concerning quality and quantity of capital by making several 
changes to the definition of capital with clear emphasis on greater unity in the definition of the 
key items. The aim of Basel 3 is to ensure that every internationally active bank is supported by a 
high quality capital buffer that can absorb losses during periods of economic distress. Basel 3 has 
eliminated Tier 3 completely as a capital component that covered market risks. Only Tiers 1 and 
2 remain, with the intention of strengthening the Tier 1 component of capital. Basel I and Basel 2 
both stipulated a total capital requirement of 8.0% of RWAs with total capital equally divided 
between Tier 1 and Tier 2. Basel 3 also maintains the 8% total capital requirement but requires 
that Tier 1 capital must constitute at least 75% with Tier 2 capital constituting the balance but 
only up to 25% of the total capital. Basel 3 also breaks down Tier 1 capital into the following: 
CET 1 and additional Tier 1 with CET 1 accounting for at least 4.5% of a bank’s RWAs (Bank 
for international settlements, 2011a:2). 
                                                     






Basel 2 Basel 3 
Tier 1  
 Paid-up share capital/common stock.   
 Disclosed reserves. 
Common Equity Tier 1  
 Common shares issued by the bank 
that meet the criteria for classification 
as common shares for regulatory 
purposes. 
 Stock surplus (share premium).  
 Retained earnings including interim 
profit or loss. 
 Accumulated other comprehensive 
income and other disclosed reserves. 
 Common shares issued by 
consolidated subsidiaries of the bank 
and held by third parties. 
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the 
calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. 
 Additional Tier 1  
 Instruments issued by the bank that 
meet the criteria for inclusion in 
additional Tier 1 capital and are not 
included in common equity Tier 1. 
 Stock surplus resulting from the issue 
of instruments included in additional 
Tier 1 capital. 
 Instruments issued by consolidated 
subsidiaries of the bank and held by 
third parties. 
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the 
calculation of additional Tier 1 
capital. 
Tier 2  
 Undisclosed reserves.  
 Asset revaluation reserves. 
 General provisions/general loan-loss 
reserves.  
 Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments  
 Subordinated debt. 
Tier 2  
 Instruments that meet the criteria for 
inclusion in Tier 2 capital but not 
included in Tier 1 capital. 
 Stock surplus (share premium) from 
the issue of instruments included in 
Tier 2 capital.  
 Instruments issued by consolidated 
subsidiaries and held by third parties 
that meet the criteria for inclusion in 
Tier 2 capital but not included in Tier 
1 capital. 
 Regulatory adjustments applied in the 
calculation of Tier 2 capital. 




against future, limited to a maximum 
of 1.25% of credit risk-weighted risk 
assets calculated under the 
standardized approach. 
Tier 3  
 At the discretion of their national 
authority, banks may also use a third 
tier of capital (Tier 3), consisting of 
short-term subordinated debt for the 
sole purpose of meeting a proportion of 
the capital requirements for market 
risks. 
 
Deductions from Tier 1 
 Goodwill.  
 Increase in equity capital resulting from 
a securitization exposure. 
Deductions from Common Equity Tier 1  
 Minority interests in non-bank 
subsidiaries.  
 Goodwill and other intangibles.  
 Deferred tax assets (DTAs).  
 Cash flow hedge reserve relating to 
items not held at fair value (positive 
amounts deducted, negative amounts 
added back).  
 Defined benefit pension assets.  
 Gains and losses due to the bank’s 
own credit risk.  
 Unrealized losses and any provision 
shortfall. 
 Any outstanding Tier 1 instruments 
that do not meet the definition of 
common equity  
Deductions from Tier 2 
 Investments in unconsolidated banking 
and financial subsidiary companies. 
 Investments in the capital of other 
banks and financial institutions (at the 
discretion of national authorities).  
 Significant minority investments in 
other financial entities. 
 
 
Table 3: Capital definition according to Basel 2 and Basel 3. Source: Author’s own summary from 
literature review. 
 
Table 3 presents the detailed capital definitions according to Basel 2 and Basel 3. Given below 




 Renaming Core Tier 1 to Common Equity Tier 1 and non-Core Tier 1 capital to 
Additional Tier 1 capital. 
 Inclusion of accumulated other comprehensive income and retained earnings in Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital. 
 Deducting the following from Common Equity Tier 1: unrealized losses on AFS 
securities; pension and deferred tax assets; cash flow hedge reserve and cumulative gains 
and losses to changes in own credit risk on fair valued financial liabilities. On the subject 
of minority interest: the net income of the third party minorities cannot be retained by the 
parent as common equity. Deferred tax assets are deducted only if these depend on future 
profit realization, and not on tax prepayment irrespective of the future profitability. In 
order to avoid double counting of equity under Basel 3 the following are excluded from 
the definition of common equity if they are sister companies: a bank’s investments in its 
own shares; and, investments in other banks, financial institutions and insurance 
companies.  
 Abolishing the distinction between upper Tier 2 and lower Tier 2 capital.  
 Eliminating Tier 3 capital. 
Basel 3 allows for a transition period before the new capital requirements are fully implemented. 
The minimum CET 1 and Tier 1 requirements came into effect between 1 January 2013 and 1 
January 2015 while the capital buffers will come into effect between 1 January 2016 and 1 
January 2019. On 1 January 2013, the minimum CET 1 requirement increased from 2% to 3.5%, 
while the Tier 1 capital requirement increased from 4% to 4.5%. Banks had to meet a 4% 
minimum CET 1 requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of 5.5% from 1 January 2014. On 1 
January 2015, banks had to meet the 4.5% CET 1 and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total 
minimum capital requirement remains constant at 8.0% of RWAs and is already in use so there is 
no transition period. The capital buffers will come into effect between 1 January 2016 and 1 
January 2019. The new deductions are being introduced incrementally at 20% a year from 2014 
and reaching 100% in 2018. Capital instruments that are currently used but do not meet the new 




  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Minimum Common Equity Ratio 2.0% 2.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital Conservation Buffer 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Minimum Common Equity + 
Capital Conservation Buffer 2.0% 2.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0% 
Phase-in of deductions from 
Common Equity 0% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Minimum Tier 1 4% 4% 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Minimum Total Capital 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Minimum Total Capital + Capital 
Conservation Buffer 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
Capital instruments that no 
longer qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2 Phased out over 10-year period starting in 2013 
Shading indicates transition/change-over period and all dates as of 1 January 
 






2.5 Private Sector Influence on Basel 3 
One can argue that international financial regulation is becoming increasingly influenced by the 
private sector and as a result, regulatory power is moving from the states to the private 
institutions (Mosley, 2009; Cohen, 2008). The private sector plays an important role as a source 
of information for drafting possible regulatory reforms. However, involvement of the private 
sector in drafting banking sector regulations may lead to the disadvantage of the public in favour 
of the banking industry. Both the regulators and the banking industry should agree on the 
importance of regulation, but when the private sector becomes too influential, regulations can be 
weakened or attenuated, thus loosing meaning (Mosley, 2009). The financial industry can 
exercise influence over the regulatory process through direct lobbying and policy advocacy and 
also through the power of the market (Cohen, 2008). The Institute for International Finance (IIF) 
is the representative of the international financial industry and the only global association of 
financial institutions: it represents over 450 leading institutions worldwide. It is considered to be 
the global voice of international banking (Westlake, 2010). The IIF participated in the Basel 3 
process, published reports on the consequences of proposed changes to capital and liquidity 
regulations and commented extensively on all stages of the process. The literature shows that 
there are different views among researchers on the strength of the bank lobby with respect to 
Basel 3. Nevertheless, there is consensus that the industry did have a tangible impact on Basel 3 
(Ballo & Lütz, 2012).  
 
Some critics argue that the EU Commission sought to dilute some of the Basel 3 requirements. 
They argue that the EU banks wanted to count more of the capital in insurance subsidiaries than 
global rules permit; this would allow some banks to continue issuing hybrid capital for longer 
than expected. The relationship between the IIF and the BCBS has been questionable. There are 
reports of behind-the-scenes interaction based on personal relationships between the two 
organizations. The chairman of the BCBS is also a co-founder of the IIF while the managing 
director of IIF is said to have been a close associate of the BCBS chairman during the 1990’s. 
These relationships suggest that the IIF has had many opportunities for exerting influence and 
may have had an enormous influence on the work and decision-making of the BCBS (Lall, 
2010). Early in 2010, a BCBS member admitted that the bank lobby was making headway and 




they also conceded that the Basel 3 reforms would be a seriously weakened version (Jenkins & 
Masters, 2010). Jenkins & Masters (2010) reported that Basel 3 was being weakened because of 
the strong lobbying by the banking industry. They argue that the regulators had responded to 
politicians and banks, who argued that excessive tightening of the rules, could limit growth and 
lending of banks. They also claim that the Basel 3 requirements were amended in response to the 
pressure placed on the BCBS by the IIF, thus making the requirements less aggressive in the 
redefinition of capital and also less aggressive in the introduction of global liquidity proposals. 
Ross (2011) argues that banks rule the world because they succeeded in lobbying to ensure that 
the Basel 3 requirements ended up being inadequate to prevent another financial crisis.  
 
2.6 Research Question and Hypotheses 
In order to address the purpose of the study and the research objectives, one research question 
and four hypotheses were formulated, as shown below. 
 
2.6.1 Research Question 
The aim of the study is to answer the following question: 
 What is the impact of the change in the definition of bank capital according to Basel 3? 
 
2.6.2 Research Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: The banks in Europe will derive more benefits than the USA banks, from the change 
in capital definition. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the banks in Europe 
will take advantage of the region to influence the BCBS decision making process for their 
benefit since the BCBS is based in Europe.  
  
 H2: The large banks will derive more benefits from the change to capital definition than 
the small banks. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that larger banks have the 




 H3: Banks with relatively higher Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratios will derive more benefit 
from the change in capital definition. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
banks with higher Basel 2 will influence the BCBS decision making process to derive 
positive benefit that would make them appear healthier at the introduction of Basel 3. 
  
 H4: Banks with a relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio derived more benefit from the 
change in capital definition. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that banks with 
lower Basel 3 capital ratio will influence the BCBS decision making process to derive 

















3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This section presents the dataset used and describes the method of data collection, analysis, and 
interpretation.  
 
The population of the study is the world’s largest commercial and investment banks ranked by 
asset size as at 31 December 2012. The 31 December 2012 date is important because it marks the 
changeover date; in other words, the date when the provisions of Basel 2 were replaced by Basel 
3. For the purpose of this study, banks are selected at consolidated (group) level and only banks 
with 31 December year ends are selected. The 31 December year end is also an important aspect 
in the study because many large banks report their financial statements at that time each year. It 
is important that only the large banks are in the sample because these are globally important 
financial institutions which are interconnected; consequently, their failure could lead to global 
financial instability. If results were to be drawn from larger samples that include large and small 
banks, then those results could not be generalized to describe what happens to globally important 
financial institutions; after all, the results might reflect only the situations of small banks that 
have very little effect on the global financial system (Shaffer, 2010).  
 
The original intention was to use a sample size of the 200 largest commercial and investment 
banks in the world, ranked by asset size. It was anticipated that the data relating to these banks 
could be obtained from the commercially available databases such as BankScope and SNL 
financial. BankScope is a global database of banks’ financial statements and ratings. SNL 
Financial also provides analysis and data for the banking, financial services and insurance 
industries. However, it became apparent that it would not be possible to use the data from any of 
these commercial databases because data points are missing on the capital definition components 
required for this study. Because of this, the required data had to be collected manually for the 
study. However it was not possible from a practical point of view to collect the data manually for 
each one of the 200 individual banks and so a decision was taken to reduce the sample size to the 
75 largest commercial and investment banks in the world. The sample then comprised the 25 
largest banks in each of the three regions: USA, Europe and Asia. The study then encountered 




most of the 25 largest banks in Asia are not in English and so it was very difficult to use their 
data. For this reason, it became necessary to remove the Asian banks from the sample resulting 
in a sample consisting of the 50 largest commercial and investment banks in the USA and 
Europe, ranked by asset size as at 31 December 2012 (see table 8 in the appendix).  
Total Assets as at December 2012 in millions of $ 
Region N Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Europe 25     1,160,943       924,552          835,068    122,516    3,484,949  
USA 25        501,575       183,872          693,666      44,012    2,359,141  
Total 50        831,259       580,984          829,542      44,012    3,484,949  
 
Table 5: Size comparison by total assets.  
This table presents the data sample of the 50 observations of the banks’ total assets as at December 2012. 
The banks are grouped into the USA and Europe regions. The data were obtained from the banks’ 2012 
financial records. 
 
In answering the research question, the study will calculate Basel 2 common equity Tier 1 capital 
ratio and Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 capital ratio at the same point in time by keeping the 
RWAs unchanged  and only changing the common equity Tier 1 capital in the calculation. As 
discussed above, Basel 3 changed the capital and the RWAs definitions in Basel 2. However, this 
study examines only the change in capital definition and so the RWAs need to be excluded in 
order to isolate that capital definition change. The following information for each of the 50 banks 
was collected: 
 Total assets as at 31 December 2012. 
 Basel 2 common equity Tier 1 capital as at 31 December 2012. 
 Basel 2 RWAs as at 31 December 2012. 
 Estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital as at 31 December 2012 where available. The estimated 
and reported figures were collected wherever these were available while in instances 
where these were not estimated, the comparative figures were calculated using the Basel 
3 capital definition.  
 Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012, calculated as Basel 3 Tier 1 capital 





3.1 Data Collection Method 
The required data were collected manually from the banks’ financial reports and were then 
cleaned, captured in Microsoft Excel and summarized. All this was a very difficult and time 
consuming exercise. It was not easy to access all of the banks’ financial reports from their 
websites and most of the websites only show recent information. In many instances, the 2012 
financial reports have been archived and are therefore not easily visible on the website while 
some of the bank websites required registration in order to access their information. The 
following data relating to the 50 banks were collected manually from the 2012 financial reports: 
Total assets; Basel 2 common equity Tier 1 capital; and Basel 2 RWAs, all as at 31 December 
2012. Since Basel 3 was only implemented from January 2013, banks were not required to report 
their estimated Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 capital in their December 2012 financial reports. 
Nevertheless 42 banks estimated and reported their Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 capital in the 
December 2012 financial reports. In this study, those reported figures are used for these 42 
banks. In the case of the 8 banks that did not provide estimated and reported Basel 3 common 
equity Tier 1 capital, the comparative figure was calculated using the change in capital definition 
by Basel 3. The reported Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 ratio as at December 2012 was also 
calculated manually, being calculated as Basel 3 capital divided by Basel 3 RWAs as at 
December 2012.  
Using the collected data, the following were calculated for each of the 50 banks in the sample: 
 Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio as at 31 December 2012. Calculated as: 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 2 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑡 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2012 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 2 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑡 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2012 
 
 
 Estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012, calculated by changing the 
capital part from Basel 2 to Basel 3 but keeping the RWAs part the same at Basel 2. 
Calculated as:  
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 3 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑡 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2012 






 Change in regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio as at December 2012. Calculated as: 
Estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio less Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio  
 
Descriptive data for the two regions included in the data sample are reported in Table 9 (see 
appendix). In the case of the ratio difference (ratio difference is used in the study as a proxy for 
the impact of the capital definition change), banks in Europe have a positive mean, median and a 
higher maximum value while the banks in the USA region have a negative mean, median and a 
lower maximum value. The combined position shows a negative mean, median and a higher 
maximum value. An examination of the estimated Basel 3 ratio shows that banks in Europe have 
a higher mean, median and the maximum value than those in the USA region. The combined 
position shows a higher mean, median and the maximum value. In the case of the Basel 2 ratio, 
the banks in Europe have a higher mean, median and the maximum value than those in the USA 
region. The combined position shows a higher mean, a lower median and a higher maximum 
value. The descriptive data show that the banks in Europe are larger than those in the USA on 
average. The data shows that the banks in Europe derived positive benefits than the USA banks 
from the change in capital definition. The data also shows that larger banks derived more benefit 
from the change in capital definition than the smaller banks. 
 
3.2 Data Analysis Methods 
In this section the methods used to analyse the collected data are presented. 
 
3.2.1 Correlation Coefficient 
The correlation coefficient is a number that gives a measure of the strength of the relationship 
between two variables. That relationship is interpreted to be positive if the values in one set of 
data increases at the same time as another but negative if the values in one set of data increases 
as the other decreases. The calculation of a correlation coefficient leads to a value between -1 to 
1. The value of -1 means that there is a negative correlation between the variables, the value of 0 




positive correlation between the variables. The relationship between the predictors and the 
dependent variable will be determined in this study by performing a correlation matrix. 
 
3.2.2 Regression Analysis  
Regression analysis tests the relationships between variables. It is used for analysing several 
variables, focusing on the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. Regression analysis is performed to give a clear indication about the 
similarities among the variables that cannot be looked at independently. A simple regression 
analysis was performed to improve the understanding of the relationship between the variables 
used in the study. It involved regressing ratio difference against some predictors. The variables 
used in the regression analysis are presented in Table 6 below. 
Category Variable Description 
Dependent RD 
 
Ratio difference which is the proxy for the 
impact of the capital definition change 
Independent B3R Reported Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio 
Independent B2R Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio 
Independent Log(B2RWA) Logged values of Basel 2 RWAs  
Independent Region Location of the banks 
 
Table 6: Variables used in the study.  
This table presents the variables used in the regression analysis. The dependent variable is RD, calculated 
as the difference between the estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio and the Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio. 
One of the four independent variables is B3R, calculated as Basel 3 common equity Tier 1 capital divided 
by Basel 3 RWAs. A second independent variable is B2R, calculated as Basel 2 common equity Tier 1 
capital divided by Basel 2 RWAs; The third such variable, Log(B2RWA), is the logged value of Basel 2 
RWAs. Since B2RWAs is reported in millions of dollars, it is logged to make it easily comparable to the 
ratio difference which is reported in percentage terms. The log scale makes it easier to 
compare values which cover a large range. The fourth variable ‘Region’ represents the location of the 





The impact of the capital definition change (RDi) regression model is presented as: 
RDi = α0 + β1*B3Ri + β2*B2Ri + β3*Log(B2RWA)i + β4*Regioni + Ɛi 
where i represents the banks. RDi is the ratio difference. α0 is the constant term. β1, β2, β3 and β4 
are the co-efficients. B3Ri is the reported Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio. B2Ri is the Basel 2 Tier 1 
capital ratio. Log(B2RWA)i is the logged value of Basel 2 RWAs, Regioni represents the location 
























In this study, a descriptive data analysis method is first used; here, the relevant descriptive 
statistics include measures of central location, variation and linear relationship. The mean and 
standard deviations were calculated in order to improve the understanding and interpretation of 
the sample data.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 (see appendix) presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values of the variables used in the study. The data sample shows that 
the banks in Europe are larger in size than the USA banks on average. If we examine the Basel 2 
Tier 1 capital ratio, then the data show that the banks in Europe have a higher mean, median and 
a higher maximum value than the USA banks. The overall position is a higher mean, median and 
a higher maximum value. Similarly, the Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio data show that the banks in 
Europe have a higher mean, median and a higher maximum value than the USA banks.  The 
overall position is a higher mean, median and a higher maximum value. The impact of the capital 
definition change data show that the European banks have a positive mean, median and a higher 
maximum value while the USA banks have a negative mean, median and a lower maximum 
value. The overall position is a negative mean, median and a higher maximum value. The data 
suggest that the change in capital definition in Basel 3 resulted in a positive impact on the 
European banks’ capital ratio and a negative impact on the USA banks’ capital ratio. The results 
suggest that larger banks derived more benefit than the smaller banks from the capital definition 
change. 
 
4.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 10 (see appendix) presents the correlation matrix applicable to the predictors and the 
dependent variable. The results show that there is some association between the predictors and 
the dependent variable. Thus, there is a weak positive relationship between the ratio difference 
and the Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio with a correlation coefficient of 0.279, which is significant at 




capital ratio with a correlation coefficient of 0.763, significant at the threshold of 5%. Basel 2 
RWAs shows a strong positive relationship with total assets with a correlation coefficient of 
0.856, significant at the threshold of 5%.  Total assets have a moderate positive relationship with 
the region, having a correlation coefficient of 0.401, significant at the threshold of 5%. 
 
4.3 Regression Results 
In this section the regression analysis are presented, to improve the understanding of the 
relationship between the variables used in the study. The study used the Newey-West robust 
standard error and covariance in the regression analysis. The results of the regression analysis are 



















Adjusted R-squared 0.2829  
F-statistic 5.8315  
Probability(F-statistic) 0.0007  
Observations 50  
 






The results show a positive relationship between the variables. One finding is that, all things 
being equal, the change in capital definition resulted in a decrease of approximately 3.5% in the 
ratio difference; a one percent increase in the reported Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio leads to an 
increase of approximately 27% in the ratio difference; a one percentage point increase in the 
Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio results in a decrease of approximately 26% in the ratio difference and 
a one percentage point increase in RWAs also results in an increase of approximately 0.28% in 
the ratio difference. Larger banks derived a benefit of approximately 0.5% from the change in 
capital definition. 
 
A test was made for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey in the residuals and the 
results are presented in table 11 (see appendix). These results indicate that there is no 
homoscedastic (constant variance) error term in the model: it changes over time. Robust standard 
errors and covariance clustered across the cross-sections per bank are thus necessary. 
 
4.4 Discussion of Results 
The results shown in the descriptive statistics indicate that the change in the Basel 3 capital 
definition resulted in a positive impact on the European banks’ capital ratios and a negative 
impact on the USA banks’ capital ratios. The results showed that the larger banks derived more 
benefit from that change than the smaller banks. From the descriptive statistics data above, the 
study accepted hypothesis H1 stating that the banks in Europe will derive more benefits than the 
USA banks, from the change in capital definition because the descriptive statistics data confirms 
that. The study also accepted hypothesis H2 stating the large banks will derive more benefits 
from the change in capital definition than the small banks because this is also confirmed in the 
descriptive statistics data. The correlation matrix shows a negative correlation between the 
capital definition change and the Basel 2 ratio. The study rejected hypothesis H3 stating that 
banks with relatively higher Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratios will derive more benefit from the 
change in capital definition. This is not the case because the capital definition change and the 
Basel 2 ratio variables are moving in the opposite directions and banks with relatively higher 
Basel 2 ratio are already looking healthy and therefore their management does not need to be 
concerned about the change in capital definition. The regression results show that the average 




reduction in capital. From the regression results, the study rejected hypothesis H4 stating that 
banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio derived more benefit from the change in 
capital definition. This is not true because the overall impact of the change in capital definition is 
a reduction in bank capital ratios and banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio 
needed to lobby for the change in capital definition in order to have more capital under Basel 3. 
 
The overall impact of the change in the capital definition can be summarized as: positive impact 
on the European banks capital ratios and a negative impact on the USA banks capital ratios; 
more benefit for the European banks than for the USA banks on average and also larger banks 
deriving more benefits from the definition change than the smaller banks. The advantage that the 
European banks have over the USA banks can maybe attributed to the fact that being in Europe 
they could have had influence on the BCBS decision making process since BCBS is also in 
Europe. The advantage that the larger banks have over the smaller banks can maybe attributed to 
the fact that being larger they have more financial resources and power to influence the BCBS 
decision making process than the smaller banks. 
 
4.5 Robust Check for Undue Influence by Outliers 
Figure 3 (see appendix) shows the possible presence of outliers in the collected data. To test 
whether these outliers unduly influenced the regression results, the regression was re-performed 
with winsorised data. The results of the winsorised data did not differ substantially from the 










5 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
FURTHER STUDIES 
5.1 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to determine the impact of the change in the capital definition 
according to Basel 3 and specifically whether that change has led to any changes in the banks’ 
reported capital ratios excluding changes in the definition of RWAs. Basel 3 changed the 
definitions of capital and the RWAs. However, the study examined only the change in the capital 
definition and by doing so, excluded the change in RWAs: this allowed the capital definition 
change to be isolated. The study used a sample of the fifty largest commercial and investment 
banks by asset size from the USA and the Europe region. The study calculated the Basel 2 Tier 1 
capital ratio and Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio at the same point in time by only changing the 
reported capital under Basel 2 and Basel 3 but keeping the RWAs the same at Basel 2 RWAs. 
The difference between the two ratios is the estimated impact of the change in the definition of 
bank capital according to Basel 3.  
 
The data sample shows that the European banks are larger in size than the USA banks on 
average. The results show that the change in capital definition in Basel 3 resulted in a positive 
impact on the European banks capital ratios and a negative impact on the USA banks’ capital 
ratios. The results suggest that the European banks benefited more from the change in capital 
definition than the USA banks and that the capital definition change benefited the larger banks 
more than the smaller banks. The advantage that the European banks have over the USA banks 
can maybe attributed to the fact that being in Europe they could have had influence on the BCBS 
decision making process since BCBS is also in Europe. The advantage that the larger banks have 
over the smaller banks can maybe attributed to the fact that being larger they have more financial 
resources and power to influence the BCBS decision making process than the smaller banks. 
Banks with relatively higher Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratios did not derive more benefit from the 
change in capital definition because the correlation matrix show that capital definition change 
and the Basel 2 ratio variables are moving in the opposite directions and also banks with 
relatively higher Basel 2 ratio are already looking healthy and therefore their management does 




Banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio also did not derive benefit from the capital 
definition change because the overall impact of the change in capital definition was a reduction 
in bank capital ratios and banks with relatively low Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio needed to lobby 
for the change in capital definition in order to have more capital under Basel 3. 
 
All other things being equal, the higher capital and tighter liquidity requirements under Basel 3 
will increase the capital requirements in banks. Given that banks are likely to raise the increased 
capital requirement under Basel 3 from the market, the economic growth and profitability of the 
banks is likely to be affected. The results of this study suggest that all other things being equal, 
the USA banks, given their smaller capital base will have better return on equity (RoE) and 
improved profitability going forward while the European banks with larger capital base will have 
lower RoE and reduced profitability going forward. The aggregate impact on the fifty banks is   
lower RoE and reduced profitability going forward. While implementation of Basel 3 calls for 
strict measures and higher capital requirements, the change in the capital definition has also 
made it easier for banks to raise capital under Basel 3 in that some items which could not count 
as capital under Basel 2 are now counted as capital.  
 
5.2 Limitations of the Study  
The study had certain limitations. First, the sample size was reduced to include only 50 large 
commercial and investments banks from the USA and Europe. As explained above, this 
reduction took place because it was not possible to obtain data from commercially available data 
bases. These databases have missing data points concerning the capital definition components 
required for this study. Secondly, the study did not include banks from Asia even though these 
are some of the largest banks in the world; as explained above, this exclusion took place because 
most of their financial reports are not reported in English, making it difficult to collect the data. 
Thirdly, only banks with 31 December year ends were examined and this excluded some of the 





5.3 Opportunities for Further Studies 
Despite the contributions made to the existing literature by this study, much remains to be 
investigated. For example, the results show that the change in capital definition benefited the 
European banks more than the USA banks on average. Also, it benefited the larger banks more 
than the smaller ones. Further studies could therefore be conducted using a larger sample size, to 





















  Bank Name Region 
Total Assets in $M 
(31 December 2012) 
Impact of the capital 
definition change on the 
bank capital ratio 
1 Danske Bank Europe          3,484,949  0.78% 
2 HSBC Europe          2,692,538  0.14% 
3 JPMorgan Chase & Co. USA          2,359,141  0.29% 
4 DNB Group Europe          2,264,845  0.82% 
5 Bank of America Corporation USA          2,209,974  -0.40% 
6 Deutsche Bank Europe          2,022,275  1.44% 
7 BNP Paribas Europe          1,907,290  -0.53% 
8 Citigroup Inc. USA          1,864,660  -1.82% 
9 Swedbank AB Europe          1,846,860  -0.50% 
10 Barclays Europe          1,490,321  -0.96% 
11 Nykredit Realkredit A/S Europe          1,433,405  0.16% 
12 Wells Fargo & Company USA          1,422,968  0.45% 
13 Royal Bank of Scotland Europe          1,312,295  1.45% 
14 UBS Europe          1,259,232  1.75% 
15 Banque Populaire CdE Europe          1,147,521  -1.73% 
16 Groupe BCPE Europe          1,147,521  -1.73% 
17 Goldman Sachs Group USA              938,555  0.04% 
18 Lloyds Banking Group Europe              924,552  0.06% 
19 Credit Suisse Group Europe              924,280  3.00% 
20 ING Group Europe              836,068  0.06% 
21 Rabobank Group Europe              752,410  -0.34% 
22 Nordea Group Europe              677,420  0.93% 
23 Intesa Sanpaolo Europe              673,472  -0.73% 
24 Credit Mutuel Group Europe              645,216  0.28% 
25 Standard Chartered Europe              636,518  1.34% 
26 BMO Financial Group USA              525,449  -2.08% 
27 La Caixa Group Europe              359,109  1.50% 
28 Bank of New York Mellon Corporation USA              358,990  -0.72% 
29 U.S. Bancorp USA              353,855  -0.26% 
30 Capital One Financial Corporation USA              312,918  -0.92% 
31 PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. USA              305,107  -0.94% 
32 KBC group Europe              256,886  -1.92% 
33 State Street Corporation USA              222,582  -0.15% 
34 Erste Group Europe              213,824  -0.27% 
35 Belfius Bank Europe              212,947  -2.73% 
36 HSBC USA Inc. USA              196,567  -0.07% 




38 Ally Financial Inc. USA              182,347  0.40% 
39 SunTrust Banks, Inc. USA              173,442  -0.15% 
40 American Express Company USA              153,140  -0.10% 
41 Citizens Financial Group, Inc. USA              127,053  -0.74% 
42 Allied Irish Banks Europe              122,516  -0.08% 
43 Fifth Third Bancorp USA              121,894  0.39% 
44 Regions Financial Corporation USA              121,347  -0.33% 
45 Northern Trust Corporation USA                97,464  -0.53% 
46 KeyCorp USA                89,236  -1.52% 
47 Comerica Incorporated USA                65,359  -0.68% 
48 Huntington Bancshares Incorporated USA                56,153  0.28% 
49 Zions Bancorporation USA                53,279  -2.22% 
50 CIT Group Inc. USA                44,012  -0.99% 
 
Table 8: List of banks used in the study.  
The total assets figures were obtained from the individual bank’s annual report of 31 December 2012. 
Impact of the capital definition change on the bank capital ratio is calculated as estimated Basel 3 ratio 







Estimated Basel 3 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
(December 2012) 
Basel 2 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio 
(December 2012) 





USA N 25 25 25 25 25 
Mean -0.52% 11.20% 11.72%                295,677                   501,575  
Median -0.33% 10.85% 11.63%                125,700                   183,872  
Std. Deviation 0.76% 2.09% 2.30%                384,357                   693,666  
Minimum -2.22% 7.38% 6.98%                  43,970                     44,012  
Maximum 0.45% 16.25% 17.24%             1,270,378                2,359,141  
Europe N 25 25 25 25 25 
Mean 0.17% 13.07% 12.90%                362,210                1,160,943  
Median 0.14% 12.10% 12.06%                301,861                   924,552  
Std. Deviation 1.26% 2.70% 2.28%                272,122                   835,068  
Minimum -2.73% 9.00% 10.24%                  50,261                   122,516  
Maximum 3.00% 20.80% 19.05%             1,123,900                3,484,949  
Total N 50 50 50 50 50 
Mean -0.18% 12.13% 12.31%                328,943                   831,259  
Median -0.15% 11.65% 11.95%                218,685                   580,984  
Std. Deviation 1.09% 2.57% 2.34%                331,295                   829,542  
Minimum -2.73% 7.38% 6.98%                  43,970                     44,012  
Maximum 3.00% 20.80% 19.05%             1,270,378                3,484,949  
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics.  
The table presents the data sample of the 50 observations. The data were obtained from the banks’ 2012 financial reports. The Ratio Difference is 
measured in percentage terms and it is calculated as estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio less Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio. The Estimated Basel 3 
Tier 1 capital ratio is measured in percentage terms and is calculated as Basel 3 Tier 1 capital divided by Basel 2 RWAs. The Basel 2 Tier 1 capital 
ratio is measured in percentage terms and is calculated as Basel 2 Tier 1 capital divided by Basel 2 RWAs. Basel 2 RWAs and Total Assets are 




  Ratio 
Difference 
Basel 3 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio 







Ratio Difference 1.000           
Basel 3 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio 
0.279* 1.000         
Basel 2 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio 
-0.014 0.763** 1.000       
Basel 2 RWAs 0.158 -0.147 -0.100 1.000     
Total Assets 0.276 0.060 0.138 0.856** 1.000   
Region 0.323* 0.246 0.254 0.101 0.401** 1.000 
 
Table 10: Correlation matrix between the predictors and the dependent variable.  
The table presents the correlation matrix between the predictors and the dependent variable. The ratio 
difference is measured in percentage terms and it is calculated as estimated Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio 
less Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio. The Basel 3 Tier 1 capital ratio is measured in percentage terms and 
calculated as Basel 3 Tier 1 capital divided by Basel 3 RWAs. The Basel 2 Tier 1 capital ratio is 
measured in percentage terms and calculated as Basel 2 Tier 1 capital divided by Basel 2 RWAs. The 
Basel 2 RWAs and Total Assets are measured in millions of dollars. Region indicates the location of the 
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Observed R-squared 9.5248 
Scaled explained SS 10.4684 
Probability F(4,45) 0.0455 
Probability Chi-Square(4) 0.0492 
Probability Chi-Square(4) 0.0332 
Observations 50 
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